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I.

Introduction

E-governments have been built in most countries since the Clinton administration adopted it as a
strategy of ‘Reinventing Government’ in the early 1990s. Moreover, informational services of egovernment have evolved from simply providing information and data to promoting transactions and
political participation based on the use of information technologies (UN, 2008).1 Corresponding to
this expansion and evolution of e-government, international organizations such as the United Nations
(UN) and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as global
information technology (IT) consulting firms have published research papers related to e-government
best practices and key success factors of e-government promotion. Based on these reports, egovernment initiatives which have succeeded in one nation have been benchmarked and imitated by
other nations.
However, it has been reported that the levels of e-government services as well as their overall
performance, have been differentiated on a per country basis even though most countries adopting
these services were in similar economic and technological environments (UN, 2008; Dunleavy et al,
2006; West, 2005; La Porte et al, 2005; 2001). Moreover, the same e-government initiatives
commonly implemented have produced different outcomes in each nation. The Business Reference
Model (BRM), one of the reference models of the U.S. Federal Enterprise Architecture framework is a
good example of this point because it was implemented in both the U.S. and Korea, but resulted in
different forms of e-government in each of the two countries.
Why do e-government initiatives which are commonly implemented to achieve similar policy
goals produce different outcomes in different nations? To answer this question, this paper examines egovernment policy structure, which has been regarded as one of the most important institutional
arrangements for e-government promotion (European Commission, 2007; Park, 2006; OECD, 2005;
Eifert and Puschel, 2004). Specifically, the legal framework, the managerial tools for coordination and
control, and the organizational arrangements of the e-government policy structures of the Bush
administration in the U.S. and of Roh administration in Korea are compared. Based on such a
comparative analysis, this study demonstrates how different institutional arrangements of egovernment policy structure influence the different outcomes of BRMs in the two nations.
Why were the BRM cases chosen for the purpose of this study? Firstly, the BRM initiatives were
key projects in both nations. The BRM was considered a ‘blue print’ for building effective and
efficient e-government in the U.S. as well as in Korea (PCGID, 2005; FEAPMO, 2003). Secondly,
1
UN (2008) reported that the 190 nations, 99% of the UN member states, have built the homepages of
government agencies and have provided diverse informational services through the home pages such as welfare,
education, tourism, etc.
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these cases appear to be ‘critical cases’ in attempting to understand the influence of institutional
factors on e-government building because (1) the e-government policy structures of both
administrations were fully involved in the course of making the BRMs, and (2) they are appropriate to
examine the causal relations between the institutional arrangements and the policy results in that the
BRMs of both nations had the same institutional origins due to the Korean government having
benchmarked the U.S. BRM (Lieberman, 2001).
To enhance the validity of this comparative case study design, multiple sources of evidence were
used (Yin, 2003). The various types of literature examined include newspaper articles, academic
papers, and testimonies before Congress, as well as policy reports published by executive agencies,
Congress, research institutes and IT consulting firms. In addition, interviews were conducted with IT
experts of various fields who had been involved in the BRM projects and were working within the egovernment policy structures in both nations.2
Furthermore, possible explanations for differing e-government outcomes from competing
perspectives are explored. By examining the possibilities of the other causes such as technologies,
environment and actors, we can see the powers of institutional explanations and can create a
potentially comprehensive explanation.3
The organization of this study is as follows: In section 2, the opposing explanations of egovernment outcomes will be critically reviewed. The analytical framework for e-government policy
structures will be made based on new institutionalism in section 3. In section 4, the comparison of the
different results of the BRM initiatives in both countries will be examined. In section 5, the egovernment policy structures of the two nations and their different influence on each stage of the
BRM initiatives will be analyzed. Lastly, we will examine the limitations of opposing explanations
based on the analysis of the BRM cases in the concluding section of this paper.

II. The Rival Explanations for e-Government Outcomes

1. Technology-Centric Explanation

2

For the analysis of the U.S. BRM, 11 structured-interviews were made with professors, IT consultants
supporting Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and federal agencies, and former/current civil servants
who are or were working on the IT adoption in the federal agencies. In addition, 16 interviews were made with
professors and researchers who have been involved in e-government research and practices, IT consultants and
former/current civil servants for analyzing the Korean case. Most of the interviews in Korea were in-depth
interviews.
3 Lieberman (2001) proposed ‘Rival Causes Strategy’ and ‘Institutional Origins Strategy’ for examining causal
inference from historical institutionalistic approach. In this study, selecting the BRM cases and the review of the
possibility of rival explanations in this study were followed by his proposals.
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Various researchers have pointed out that information, data, and information technologies are
critical determinants of e-government outcomes and the overall performance of information systems.
Firstly, the quality and the accuracy of data and information have been considered as critical factors
(Redman, 1998; Tayi and Ballou, 1998). Mismatched data structure, imperfect database design, and
improper data allocation channels were also pointed out as key factors contributing to the failure of IT
systems (Ambite et al. 2002; Dawes, 1996). Secondly, technological factors such as technological
interoperability (Jung, 2002), technological complexity, and emergence of new technologies (Dawes
and Nelson, 1995) have been regarded as important for the success of information systems. Some
researchers have shown that characteristics of legacy systems (Duchessi and Chengalur-Smith, 1998)
and technological capability of IT staffs (Dawes and Pardo, 2002) are also important to the outcomes
and performance of IT systems.
By stressing the importance of technological factors on e-government outcomes and performance
of information systems, some research based on technological determinism says that technologies
have autonomous influence on individuals, institutions, and society (Fountain, 2001: 84).4 And
technological determinism has emerged as dominant perspective in the field of e-government research
(Johnes and Orlikowski, 2007; Bekker and Homberg, 2005; Snellen, 2005). From this perspective, IT
adoption is not only the most important factor in successful e-government building, but also regarded
as the primary driving force of all the changes in government. One of the best examples of this
perspective is Alvin Toffler (1980; 1990). He argued that the Third Wave would bring about a new
civilization with electronic revolutions staffed by ‘information workers’ in ‘intelligent buildings’ full
of ‘electronic offices’.
To technological determinists, e-government represents the future image of government and a
‘panacea’ for all the problems of government. Along these lines, they argue that IT would make
government more efficient and more democratic. In addition, government based on IT would be
organized in networks rather than formal hierarchies (Toffler, 1990). This perspective can also evolve
further into technological utopianism which states that IT is the central enabling element of a utopian
vision of public administration (Lee, 2005; Margetts, 1999: 165).

2. Environment-Centric Explanations

Environment-centric explanations emphasize environmental factors such as political, economic,
social, cultural, and demographic environments of e-government and IT systems. From this approach,
4

Technological determinism contains two kinds of deterministic views: (1) characteristics of technology and
the directions of technological changes are determined with internal logic of technology or economical
rationalism; (2) technologies have autonomous and inevitable influence on individuals, economic lives, and
society (Fountain, 2001: 84).
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the environmental factors can serve as a major force attributing to the differences of e-government
policy results. Furthermore, some scholars have argued that the environmental factors can determine
everything and overwhelm the impact of other factors when determining the results of information
systems under environmental determinism (Kraemer et al, 1989: 9).
In fact, a content analysis of each nation’s homepage demonstrates the fact that geographical,
cultural, and religious backgrounds of the country influence the content of e-government services
(West, 2005: 141-6). In addition, some surveys on e-government have revealed that differences in the
demographical structure of a nation were a major source of different e-government usage (Taylor
Nelson Sofres, 2002; 2001).
According to some statistical analysis, the levels of economic development (Hargittai, 1999;
Kiiski and Pohjola, 2002; Norris, 2001: 68-94) and scientific development (West, 2005: 160-4; Norris,
2001: 88) have been pointed out as the most critical factors of e-government promotion. However, the
impact of democracy, education, and cultural heritage on e-government seem to be controversial to
date (Moon, Welch and Wong, 2005). According to some research, their influence was not statistically
significant (West, 2005: 160-164; Norris, 2001: 88; Danziger and Anderson, 2002), and vice versa
(Katchanovski and La Porte, 2005).
Another aspect of the literature from the environment-centric perspective deals with the
influence of globalization on e-government. Some scholars have argued that globalization tends to
bring about a convergence of each nation’s system of government which thus creates a common
pattern (Kettl, 1997; OECD, 1993); this statement can also include IT adoption. First, globalization
generates a joint response by many governments to common policy problems. Consequently, it leads
to the convergence of configurations and services of e-government. For example, in the course of
tackling international drug trafficking, Interpol, the U.S. FBI, and Korean Prosecutors’ Office are
not only sharing information related to drug trafficking but also have tried to link their own
information systems. Such behavior will bring about a convergence of the information systems of
each agency (Ministry of Justice of Korea, 2001).
Secondly, the international organizations like the OECD, UN and the global IT consulting firms
have impacted the e-government policy of each nation in the globalization era. Such international
organizations have built the e-government research centers and have disseminated policy reports,
which contain the best practice, policy reviews and analyses regarding key success factors of egovernment (Eifert and Puschel, 2004; Welch and Wong, 2001). In addition, the global IT consulting
firms have disseminated the best practices and policies of one nation to another by using their
knowledge management networks in the course of e-government building consultation (Dunleavy et
al, 2006: 254). Through these mechanisms, the best practices of one nation have been diffused to
other nations which have thus led to the homogenization of e-government among nations.
5

3. Actor-Centric Explanations

Actor-centric explanations focus on the characteristics, behaviors and the interaction of actors
related to e-government when explaining e-government outcomes. Some scholars have argued that
actors’ attitudes, such as adaptation and resistance to the changes in the course of the IT adoption and
usage, may have a big influence upon the results of e-government and its performance. For example,
Klein and Hirschheim (1983) argued that individuals may have different attitudes towards IT adoption
according to their job positions and individual interests. Consequently, it is necessary to manage the
conflicts of interest and to enhance the understandability of IT systems in order to achieve successful
IT adoption.5
Another explanation based on this view is ‘managerial actionalism’. From this viewpoint, the
primary causes for changes of IT and its performance stem from the actions of managers because
actors can exercise their own free will in choosing their actions which in turn will bring their own
consequences (Kraemer et al, 1989: 14). Based on this model, Kraemer and King (1981) focused on
managerial actions and managerial means, which brought computing resources into organizations and
distributed them throughout. In addition, Heintze and Bretschneider (2000) pointed out that managers’
leadership and their managerial behavior is critical to the successful adoption of IT.
Some studies focus on groups and organizations which participate in the e-government building
process. Specifically, this kind of literature concentrates on the following issues: (1) identifying the
groups which participate in the e-government building process; (2) examining the characteristics of
their interactions and consequences such as policy networking, collaborations, competition and
conflicts among organizations in the course of e-government building. According to research
conducted by Yildiz (2005), diverse groups and organizations including politicians, civil servants,
professors and researchers, IT companies, the press, NGOs and even international organizations had
participated in the Turkish e-government building process. Some research illustrated and compared
organizational arrangements and their subsequent division of labor for e-government policy in each
nation (Park, 2006; OECD, 2005; Eifert and Puschel, 2004).
Moreover, there is various research pertaining to the conflicts, competition, and networking
which takes place among government agencies and is based on their different goals and interests, in
the course of Korean e-government building (Yoo and Yoon, 2005; Phang, 2002; Kim, 2001; Mo,
2000). Their participation and interaction have produced ‘the politics of e-government’ (Yoon, 2003)

5 Refer to Fountain (2001: 86-87) on the main streams and the critical comments on the research of the
relationship between information technology and individual factors in the field of communications and
psychology.
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and they have been regarded as a critical factor in determining the different outcomes of egovernment building (Dawes and Pardo, 2002; Fountain, 2001).

4. Institution-Centric Explanations

Institution-centric explanations focus on the impact that formal or informal institutions have on
IT adoption or e-government building. This kind of research can be categorized into three groups as
follows. The first group of this approach examines how specific institutional characteristics, such as
laws and regulations, budget processes, jurisdictions, autonomy of government agencies, and contract
systems, influence IT systems and e-government building (Margetts, 2006; OECD, 2005; Dawes and
Pardo, 2002; Fountain, 2001; Moon 2002). These institutions can constrain and guide the actions of
participants in the process of e-government building. Therefore the power of the institutions can
influence the outcomes of e-government.
Second, culture, value systems and informal institutions were also paid attention to when
assessing influential factors in the adoption of IT systems. According to this type of literature, the
configuration and overall performance of IT systems are influenced by protocols related to
information system usage, interpretation framework, and organizational culture (Perri 6, 2004;
Orlikowski, 2000; Sarker, 2000; Laudon and Westin, 1986; Laudon, 1985) plus the impacts IT
infrastructures and hardware. Applying ‘Grid-Group’ cultural framework, Perri 6 (2004) argued that
the decision making which is behind IT adoption may be influenced by the various types of
organizational cultures. Laudon and Westin(1986) exhibited that the operation and management of IT
systems are more influenced by the culture and value systems of the organizations, which is in
contrast to views that the adoption of is IT influenced by technological factors. At the macro-level,
Margetts and Dunleavy (2002) argued that the idiosyncratic values and robustness in the public sector
could be reasons for the e-government failures in the U.K.
The third group of this approach examines the impact of macro institutional arrangements of
nations on e-government and IT policy. For example, the institutional relations between governments
and the IT industry have been pointed out as being one of the factors which influences the overall
performance of e-government and national information infrastructure (Dunleavy et al, 2006; Margetts,
1999; Song, 1998). In addition, some of Korean scholars have paid attention to the characteristics of
the Korean state and its institutional configurations in the field of IT policy when explaining the
development of e-government and the fast development of IT industry in Korea. For example, Hong
(2003) and Hwang (2003) pointed out that the degree of centralization and fund raising systems for
promoting the IT industry, were important factors which contributed to the success of IT policy in
Korea. From a more macro point of view, Adler and Henman (2005) argued that different welfare
7

state regimes, such as market-oriented, network-oriented and customer-oriented, produced different
characteristics of welfare information systems and supported their argument with comparative
research of OECD countries. Thus the welfare information systems in the Netherlands, one of the
network-oriented welfare regime countries, have more collaborative characteristics than a nation such
as the U.S., which can be categorized as one of the market-oriented regime countries, although the
major goals of building welfare information systems were to enhance the efficiency of welfare policy.

5. Critical Review

Previous literature from diverse perspectives is helpful when attempting to understand the causes
of e-government outcomes and performance. Nevertheless, each group of explanations seems to have
weaknesses. First of all, all of the explanations except for institution-centric one seem to
underestimate the power of the institutional arrangements. The institutions not only serve to constrain
actors in the e-government policy process and to structure the interactions among them, but also
mediate the impact of information technologies and other various environmental factors (Fountain,
2007; 2001; Johnes and Orlikowski, 2007; Bekker and Homberg, 2005; Snellen, 2005; Welch and
Wong, 2001). Specifically, these kinds of explanations may be limited in their ability to answer the
following questions: (1) why are the same or similar technologies enacted in different forms in
different countries; (2) why are e-government outcomes differentiated even in similar policy
environments such as globalization; (3) why have some countries succeeded in coordinating actors in
the course of e-government building while others have not.
To further illustrate my point, let me take the example of research which has been conducted on
the e-government policy structure from the actor-centric perspective. From this perspective, the egovernment policy structure has been defined as the organization or the groups of organizations that
performs the various functions related to e-government building such as planning, decision making,
implementing, evaluating, etc (Park, 2006; OECD, 2005). This kind of research is effective in
identifying organizations which are involved in the e-government policy process and the division of
labor among organizations in the e-government policy process. However, proponents of the actor
centric argument could not clearly point out the mechanisms and tools which were used in achieving
the coordination among the various organizations, which may have different interests and goals.
Consequently, the actor-centric approach seems to have weaknesses in answering the following
questions: (1) why differences in the level of coordination occur; (2) with what can the e-government
policy structures mobilize the resources and authority for building e-government; and (3) why the
structures of the relationships between organizations of different countries or, administrations in same
nation, differ from each other.
8

To answer these questions, we need to analyze institutional factors such as legal frameworks and
managerial tools which are used for coordination and control as well as organizational arrangements
(Fountain, 2007; 2001; Snellen, 2005; Lynn et al. 2001). By including these factors in our analysis, we
can find the mechanisms and causes that contribute to the structure of relationships between
participants. Additionally we can also begin to understand what managerial tools are used for control
and coordination by organizations to achieve e-government policy goals in the e-government building
process.
However, the previous literature from the institution-centric explanations also seems to have
following limitations. Firstly, there seems to be a lack of detailed analysis on the institutional elements
which influence e-government policy results. For example, most literature which analyzes the
institutional factors of e-government policy structures does not analyze comprehensively and clearly
the legal frameworks and managerial tools which are complementary to each other (Kim and Lee,
1998; Wolfe, 1999; Margetts, 1996). This leads to criticisms that the causal relations between
institutions and other variables in this kind of research are vague (Yang, 2003).
Secondly, methodological problems can be pointed out. The impact of the institutional
arrangements on policy outcomes may be examined more clearly from cross-national comparative
perspectives (Sheingate, 2001). However, the cross-national comparative research on e-government
doesn’t seem to be enough (Fountain, 2002). In addition, most previous cross-national comparative
research on e-government is not only descriptive research which introduces e-government policy
structures and e-government initiatives in different countries, but also some of them have been
conducted by different researchers who adopted different analytical framework. These methodological
problems may be one of the causes that lower the level of rigorousness of the institution-centric
research. In conclusion, a more comprehensive analysis on the institutional arrangements from the
cross-national comparative perspective should be carried out to overcome the limitations posed by
previous e-government research with institution-free analytical framework and the non-comparative
methodology.

III. Theoretical Background and Analytical Framework

To overcome the limitations of previous research and to answer the research question, this paper
adopts new institutionalism as a theoretical background. New institutionalists have stressed that “the
institutions matter” in explaining the difference of policy outcomes from the comparative perspective
(Campbell, 2004; Shaingate, 2003; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992).

9

1. Institutions, Policy Process, and Policy Outcomes

Institutions are defined as formal or informal rules and procedures that structure the conduct of
actors (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). Similarly, North (1990) defined institutions as sets of formal and
informal rules which are accompanied by monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms that cause actors to
comply with these rules.6 From this point of view, institutional arrangements function as a structure
of political struggle and policy process that contribute to different policy outcomes; this argument will
be clarified in the following paragraphs.
Firstly, institutions constrain available policy alternatives (Scharpf, 2000). That is to say that the
permissibility and content of policy options can be differentiated according to the institution. For
example, countries differ in the range of institutionally permissible policy options. An example is the
power of governments to determine wages and working hours—an option that was routinely exercised
by Belgian governments in the 1980s and 1990s and available in most other countries as well, but is
ruled out in Germany by the constitutional guarantee of collective bargaining. At the international
level, institutions such as the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) or regulations of international
organizations like World Trade Organization (WTO) can pose limitations on permissible policy
options when it comes to the trade policy of each member state (Pierre and Peters, 2000).
Secondly, participants in policy process are defined and their interactions are constrained under
the institutional arrangements (Timmermans, 2001; Hall and Taylor, 1996). According to the different
institutional arrangements, participants in decision-making and their incentive structures, decisionmaking protocol, the centrality of policy decision-making, stability of political elites and the level of
sharing the purposes and values of policies, can all be different. Especially, institutional arrangements
can have great influence on the locations and numbers of veto points in the policy process. Thus they
may lead to different policy outcomes.
Thirdly, institutions influence the adoption and the spread of policy ideas and knowledge.
According to the institutional arrangements, not only width and speed but also content of the adoption
of policy ideas can differ (Skocpol and Rueschmeyer, 1996). For example, there were big differences
of the adoption of New Public Management (NPM) ideas and their institutionalization among the
U.K., Canada, and France. The reason for the differences among those nations is that there were big
differences in terms of institutional arrangements which mediated the adoption of similar NPM ideas.
In detail, the NPM ideas were adopted most widely and radically in the U.K because the prime
6

Although different new institutionalism has defined institutions differently, there seems to be an agreement as
follows: institutions are the foundation of social life. “They consist of formal and informal rules, monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms, and systems of meanings that define the context within which individuals, groups and
organizations, nation-state operate and interaction with each other.”(Campbell, 2004)
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minister at the time, who possessed a great deal of institutionalized power, took the initiative to
promote NPM reform in the U.K. However, NPM proposals were initiated by Congress in Canada,
and Central bureaucracy in France. In these countries the NPM proposals were not supported by the
institutionalized sources of power in the course of their adoption and spread (Saint-Martin, 2004).
Fourthly, institutional arrangements can influence the policy capacity of government (Weaver
and Rockman, 1993; Skowronek, 1992). The relations between the executive and the legislature,
relations between the core executive and bureaucracy, coherence, stability and autonomy of
bureaucracy, etc. can all help shape the overall characteristics of policy process and the policy
capacity of government.

2. Complexes of Institutions and Organizations

Institutions are no longer conceptualized as monolithic entities but as compounds composed of
various elements (Orren and Skowronek, 2004; Lowndes, 1996). Along these lines, institutions are
now seen as complexes whose elements are linked to one another horizontally and composed the
hierarchical structure of institutions. For example, Weaver and Lockman (1993: 10-11) identified the
three tiers of institutions of the state: the first tier of institutional arrangement related to the relations
between executive and legislature; the second tier related to the configurations of executive branch;
and the third related to the types of bureaucracy. Lynn et al (2001) argued that three-level structure of
governance exists based on an institutional framework: (1) the institutional (public choice) level
related to the legislations, formal authorities, the centrality of control, accountability, and the level of
coordination; (2) the managerial level related to monitoring/control mechanisms including
performance standards, incentives, and sanctions; (3) the primary work which is concerned with
relationship between primary workers and consequences.
Among these institutional elements, there are strong relationships which are in part characterized
by their complementary effects. The effect of a particular institution depends on the degree of synergy
it has with other institutions (Offe, 2006). The superior institutions in this relationship have the ability
to positively or negatively influence the operations of inferior institutions in the hierarchical
institutional arrangements (Amable, 2000). This interrelationship among institutional elements
referred to as institutional complementarities which produce different varieties of capitalism and
models of production regimes (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In addition, the discussion of the complexity
of institutional arrangements leads to arguments regarding the relationship between the elements. For
example, there may be tensions and conflicts among institutional elements that have different
characteristics and those tensions and conflicts may be one of the causes of institutional change
(Orren and Skowronek, 2004).
11

However, stressing the powers of institutions should not mean ‘institutional determinism’
whereby institutions determine actions. The new institutionalists have put an emphasis upon notions
that institutions just provide actors opportunities and constraints, and do not determine their actions.
From this view point, the analysis of the institutional arrangements should be combined with the
analysis of the action factors, such as the characteristics of the major actors, networks and
organizational arrangements, ideas and incentives (Hay, 2006; 2001; Peters et al. 2005; Streek and
Thelen, 2005; Katznelson, 1997). Under different institutions, the method of networking and the
characteristics of organizational arrangements can be differentiated. Additionally different
combinations of institutions and organizations can produce different policy outcomes (Nee and
Ingram, 1998; Ikenberry et al., 1988)

3. Analytical Framework

Based on the critical review of previous research and the theoretical background of the new
institutionalism, the e-government policy structure has been redefined and the analytical framework of
this study built. Most of all, in this study, the e-government policy structure is defined as follows: the
combination of diverse institutional arrangements which result in the coordination and control of the
organizations which are engaged in the e-government policy process. Based on this definition, we can
comprehensively examine the source of authority, tools for coordination and control, and the
participants who are involved in e-government building process.
The analytical framework of the e-government policy structure has a three-tier structure as
follows: (1) legal framework; (2) managerial tools for control and coordination; (3) organizational
arrangements. The first tier is the legal framework for e-government building. This level is concerned
with the establishment of government relations, or broad strategic alignments at the legislative level
(Lynn et al. 2001). More specifically, the legal framework defines the formal roles of the
organizations participating in the policy process, their accountability, and financial resources
(Fountain, 2007). At this level, the degree of the concentration of authority, which is measured by the
concentration of functions in rules and law related, can be determined and has been regarded as one of
the main foundations of policy capacity (Skowronek, 1992).
The second tier is composed of managerial tools for coordination and control in the course of egovernment building .Generally, this level is concerned with the elaboration of strategies by
organizational actors (Lynn et al. 2001). This tier is grounded in the legal framework and the
managerial tools are selected based on the legal framework. It is concerned with relationships between
organizations, and particularly deals with the way the actions of e-government building are
coordinated. These elements can contribute to making routinized, stable, and recurring modes of
12

behavior within legal frameworks and among organizations. So, they make their impact by lending
government operations coherence and effectiveness (Skowronek, 1992). In this research, managerial
devices will be identified based on Vedung (1988) as following three mechanisms: (1) authorities; (2)
budgets; and (3) persuasion.
Third tier consists of organizational arrangements in e-government building. At this level, we can
examine not only public and private organizations which assume the roles of e-government building,
but also their interactions in the course of e-government building. The organizational arrangements
are based on both formal norms such as legal framework, government contracts, and regulations. That
is to say that the organizations are selected based on legal framework and, sometimes, reorganized by
the legal framework. In addition, the organizational arrangements are influenced by informal social
networks between professional experts and public servants in the field of e-government (Fountain,
2007). The organizations should comply with the managerial tools and procedural routines and report
the results of their activities. The analytical framework of this research is illustrated in <Figure 1>.

<Figure 1> Analytical Framework

IV. Business Reference Model in the U.S. and Korea

1. The U.S. BRM
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The BRM is one of the reference models of the Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA)
framework. First of all, let us define Enterprise Architecture (EA). The EA serves as a blueprint for
the business operations of an organization and outlines the information and technology needed to
carry out these operations, both currently and prospectively. As such, it is an information technology
management and planning tool. It is designed to be comprehensive and scalable, to account for future
growth needs. The EA planning represents a business-driven approach to IT management that
emphasizes interoperability and information sharing (Seifert, 2006).7 In the Information Technology
Management Reform Act (ITMRA: P.L. 104-106), it is defined as “an integrated framework for
evolving or maintaining existing information technology and acquiring new information technology to
achieve the agency’s strategic goals and information resources management goals.”
The U.S. federal government has tried to adopt the EA framework to help manage its IT systems
and the IT budget since the late 1980s. For example, National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) proposed NIST Framework in 1989 and a few federal agencies like DoE, DoD and USDA
developed and adopted their own EA frameworks. In addition, the ITMRA passed in 1996, tasked
agency chief information officers (CIOs) with, among other responsibilities, “developing, maintaining,
and facilitating the implementation of sound and integrated information technology architecture for
the executive agency.”
However, the adoption of the EAs based on the ITMRA and other rules was evaluated as
ineffective by the Bush administration (OMB, 2002). The established EAs in federal agencies were
organization-oriented. Consequently, they were not able to be linked to each other and could not
provide useful information and achieve their goals at the overall federal government level. Therefore,
the E-Government Act (P.L. 107-347), passed in 2002, tasks the Administrator of the Office of EGovernment with overseeing the development of EAs, both within and across agencies.
The act defined enterprise architecture as “means — (i) a strategic information asset base, which
defines the mission; (ii) the information necessary to perform the mission; (iii) the technologies
necessary to perform the mission; and (iv) the transitional processes for implementing new
technologies in response to changing mission needs.”8 The EA in the act is a planning and managing
tool used to guide federal information technology investments, with a specific focus on improving
efficiency and identifying common applications that can be used government-wide. As noted by the
OMB, “the purpose of this effort is to identify opportunities to simplify processes and unify work
across the agencies and within the lines of business of the federal government. The outcome of this
7

The “enterprise,” for which architecture is created, refers to either a “single organization or mission area that
transcends more than one organizational boundary (e.g., financial management, homeland security).” The
architecture represents a “big picture” view of how the enterprise operates and carries out its responsibilities
(Seifert, 2006).
8 116 STAT. 2902.
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effort will be a more citizen-centered, customer-focused government that maximizes technology
investments to better achieve mission outcomes.”9
By the E-Government Act, the FEA “includes (1) a baseline architecture; (2) a target
architecture; and (3) a sequencing plan”. In addition, it has five reference models: Performance,
Business, Service Component, Data, and Technical. 10 Each of the reference models represents
specific aspects of the FEA, and provides a framework, or a shared language, for departments and
agencies to develop technology solutions that can be used by the federal government collectively
(Seifert, 2006).
The BRM is defined as “a function-driven framework for describing the business operations of
the federal government independent of the agencies that perform them and it provides an organized,
hierarchical construct for describing the functions and day-to-day business operations of the federal
government.”(FEAPMO, 2002) The model describes the federal government’s Lines of Business,
including operations and services for the citizen, independent of the agencies, bureaus and offices that
perform them. By describing the federal government around common business areas instead of the
stove-piped, agency-by-agency view, the BRM promotes agency collaboration (FEAPMO, 2003).
Moreover, by following the BRM, performance measures, government initiatives, and government
agencies can be integrated as a single cross-agency initiative and the FEA reference models can be
easily integrated along business lines, providing a foundation for the Component-Based Architecture
design. In conclusion, “The BRM serves as the foundation for the FEA.” (FEAPMO, 2003)

2. Korean BRM

The BRM and the FEA of the Bush administration were benchmarked by the Roh administration
in Korea for developing the Korean BRM and ‘the Governmental Information Technology
Architecture (GITA)’, a Korean version of FEA framework. In the initial stage of the Roh
administration, there was criticism that a redundant IT investment had been made in building e-

9
10

http:www.feapmo.gov/feaHistory.asp, accessed March 10, 2008.

FEAPMO (2004) defined the reference models as follows: (1) Service Component Reference Model (SRM)
is “Business and performance-driven functional framework that classifies service components with respect to
how they support business and/or performance objectives”; (2) Performance Reference Model (PRM) is
“Standardized framework to measure the performance of major IT investments and their contribution to program
performance”; (3) Data Reference Model (DRM) is “Model describing, at an aggregate level, the data and
information that support program and business line operations”; (4) Technical Reference Model (TRM) is
“Component-driven, technical framework used to identify the standards, specifications, and technologies that
support and enable the delivery of service components and capabilities.”
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government and that the effect of e-government had been relatively low in providing citizen-centric
services and enhancing government performance. It was for this reason that the level of information
sharing was low and that the e-government systems were built in a ‘stove-piped’ style due to the fact
that the links between functions of agencies were not identified and the collaboration between the
agencies was facilitated through information systems (PCGID, 2005; Seo, 2004; MIC, 2003).
In tackling such problems, the U.S. BRM and the FEA were seen as good models by the policy
makers in the field of e-government. In particular, the “holistic view” of the OMB’s e-government
policy and the ‘cross-agency’ functional approach of the U.S BRM were paid attention to by the
policy makers in Korea.11 Diverse forums on the EA were held and some experts in the field of IT
argued that Korean government should adopt the EA framework following the U.S Federal
Government model. In addition, government agencies such as National Computerization Agency
translated and distributed the policy reports of the U.S. BRM and the FEA. At last, the BRM and the
GITA were selected as core projects by the Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and
Decentralization (PCGID) (PCGID, 2005).
For the above reasons, the definition of the Korean BRM and its purposes were similar to those
of its counterpart in the U.S. The Korean BRM is defined as “a government-wide functional map
independent of government agencies for providing citizen-centric public services, driving the
government innovation and enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of e-government.” (PCGID,
2005) According to the e-Government Project Annual Report 2006, the purpose of the Korean BRM
was set as follows: (1) to promote government reform by identifying opportunities to simplify
processes and to enhance the level of collaboration across agencies; (2) to provide a government-wide
functional map supporting government innovation in the fields of deregulation, reorganization,
personnel management, public finance, IT investment, etc.; (3) to provide a holistic functional map for
reducing the redundancy of IT investment, promoting information-sharing, and establishing
information systems linkage across agencies. (MoGAHA, 2007)

<Figure 2> The U.S. BRM and the Korean BRM

11

From the interviews with the consultant and the researchers who participated in the Korean BRM project on
Dec. 13, 2007.
16

3. Difference between the U.S. BRM and the Korean BRM

Although the BRM initiatives started with similar goals in both countries and the U.S. BRM
model was imitated by Korean policy makers, the outcomes of the projects in the both nations were
different in the following respects. Firstly, in terms of the structure of the BRM, the U.S. BRM has a
function-oriented structure independent of the federal agencies. As illustrated in <Figure 2> above,
the current U.S. BRM has a three-tiered hierarchical structure, which consists of 4 Business Areas, 39
Lines of Business, and 153 Sub-Functions (FEAPMO, 2003). The current Korean BRM has a fivelevel hierarchical structure, which contains the 15 first-level functions, the 67 second-level functions
and the 491 third-level functions. However, the Korean BRM has an organization-oriented structure.
As illustrated in <Figure 2> above, the root category of the Korean BRM is ‘Ministry’. Moreover, the
levels of functions are followed by the organization structure of the ministry. That is to say that the
second-level functions of the Korean BRM consist of functions which the ‘bureaus/offices’, the higher
level of organizations in the ministry, are carrying out. The third-level of functions pertains to the
function of ‘divisions’, which represent the lower level of organizations in the ministry.12 (MoGAHA,
2007a) This means that the Korean government could not achieve the original goals of the BRM
construction while the U.S. federal government succeeded.
Secondly, the U.S. BRM provides its users with detailed information on government functions
and has a code-system for government functions and sub-functions, but the Korean version does not.

12

Ministries of the Korean government consist of several ‘bureaus’ or ‘offices.’ In turn, there are several
‘divisions’ in a bureau/office. Thus, ministries, bureaus/offices, and divisions are hierarchically aligned in the
organizational system of Korean government.
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For example, in the U.S. the management system for the FEA, the Federal Enterprise Architecture
Management Systems (FEAMS) was built. The system provides users with an intuitive approach to
discover and potentially leverage business services, components, and data across the government
(FEAPMO, 2003). On the contrary, there are no explanations and information about the functions of
the Korean BRM, even in printed form.13
Thirdly, with respect to utilization and management authorities, the U.S. BRM has been managed
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and is used for controlling the IT investment of the
federal agencies. However, the Korean BRM is managed by Ministry of Government Administration
and Home Affairs (MoGAHA), whose major function was organizational management for Korean
government. In addition, the Korean BRM is used as one of the sub-systems of the ‘HAMONY
system’, one of the government-wide management information systems. (MoGAHA, 2007a)
These differences led to the divergence of the BRM adoptions and performance related to the
BRM between the two countries. In the U.S., it was reported that redundant IT initiatives could be
identified and the level of information sharing among federal agencies was enhanced by using the
BRM. For example, the OMB found that the information systems which the Department of Education
had tried to build provided similar services to the e-Grant system, one of the government-wide IT
systems of the Bush administration, following the adoption of the BRM. Consequently the OMB
didn’t allocate resources for the system of the Department (OMB, 2002). In addition, Department of
Labor, House and Urban Development Agency, and the Department of Education discovered that they
provided similar job training programs for the unemployed by using the BRM. As a result, they shared
related data and information among themselves and coordinated the programs of each agency
(Rocheleau, 2006: 148-155).
However, it is reported that the Korean BRM was one of the reasons that the government-wide
management systems based on the BRM had not worked very well and had not had its expected
impact on the system. Because the BRM had an organization-centric structure, the users were
prevented from finding similar programs to collaborate with and from linking programs and functions
government-wide (Im, 2006). In addition, the BRM had been of little use for enhancing the level of
information sharing. This was due to the fact that there is no information about the functions of the
BRM available and also because of its organization-centric structure. Based on the previous reasons, it
was difficult to identify the functions and organizations in which information sharing was required for
better performance and higher efficiency with the BRM.14

(MOG
13

From telephone interview with the public official of the MoGAHA, who was concerned with the
management of the Korean BRM on April 29, 2008
14 From the interview with the consultant who participated in the government-wide information sharing project
of the next administration of the Roh administration on September 15. 2009
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V. Analysis

1. Analysis of e-Government policy structures in the U.S. and Korea

1) The e-Government Policy Structure of the Bush Administration in the U.S.

(1) Legal Framework

The E-Government Act of 2002 was the major legal framework for e-government building under
the Bush administration. The act prescribes the formal roles of federal agencies, resources, and their
accountability for e-government building. One of the major features of the act was establishing the
Office of e-Government under the director of the OMB. According to the Act, the Office of eGovernment shall assist the Director “in carrying out (1) all functions management and promotion of
e-government services; (2) all of the functions assigned to the Director under federal management and
promotion of electronic government services; and (3) other electronic government initiatives,
consistent with other statutes.”15
The Administrator of the Office was given a great deal of the authority for building egovernment such as: (1) planning authority of building government-wide strategies, promoting
innovative uses of IT by agencies, and conducting capital planning with Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the OMB; (2) oversight and evaluation authority over the
implementation of e-government, the development of enterprise architectures, and information
security and privacy etc.; (3) budget authority of advising the Director on the resources required to
develop and effectively administer e-government initiatives, overseeing the distribution of EGovernment Funds, and of controlling capital planning and investment for information technology;
(4) coordination authority for promoting e-government and the efficient use of IT by agencies,
providing overall leadership and direction to the executive branch on e-government particularly
initiatives involving multiagency collaboration, leading the activities of the CIO Council. 16 In
conclusion, all kinds of authorities for building government-wide e-government such as planning,
overseeing, budgeting, and coordinating were concentrated on the Office of e-Government in the
OMB under the e-Government Act of 2002.

(2) Managerial Tools for Control and Coordination
15

116 STAT. 2902-2903

16

§ 3602. Office of Electronic Government in the E-Government Act of 2002
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A. Tools based on authority
The OMB developed several evaluation frameworks for control and coordination in egovernment building. Firstly, the OMB developed the ‘traffic-light’ scorecard.17 With this framework,
each federal agency’s e-government initiatives results as well as other President Management Agenda
(PMA) had been monitored over a quarter of a year (Bruel, 2007). Each federal agency was very
sensitive to the results because President Bush was highly interested in them and their improvement.
In addition, the results were reported during a cabinet meeting and related to the allocation of budget
for e-government initiatives.18
In addition, the Office of e-Government developed evaluation framework only for e-government
initiatives. For example, the indexes such as (1) Adoption/Participation; (2) Usage; and (3) Customer
Satisfaction, were adopted for evaluating e-government initiatives.19 Moreover, the OMB set the midterm performance and production baselines for each e-government initiative and had monitored
whether they were achieved or not. Particularly, in order to check each agency’s implementation of
the FEA, the Office developed an assessment tool for agencies to evaluate their enterprise
architectures and for the OMB to monitor each agency’s improvement of the FEA adoption (Fountain,
2004).20

B. Tools based on budget
The Office of e-Government has used control and coordination tools based on budget. Firstly, the
Office could utilize the 345 million e-Government Fund of the fiscal years 2002 to 2007 under the EGovernment Act of 2002.21 In the course of distributing the Fund, the Administrator of the Office
should establish procedures for accepting and reviewing proposals for funding and assist the Director
in coordinating resources that agencies receive from the Fund with other resources available to
agencies for similar purpose.”22

The scorecard employs a simple “traffic light” grading system to track the status and progress of each
department and major agency. ‘Green’ means that implementation is proceeding according to the plans agreed
upon with the OMB; ‘yellow’ means there is slippage in the implementation schedule, quantity of deliverables,
or other issues requiring adjustment by the agency to achieve the initiative on a timely basis; and ‘red’ means the
initiative is in serious jeopardy and unlikely to realize its objectives absent significant management intervention
(Bruel, 2007).
18 From the interview with the former civil servant of the OMB on July12, 2007
17
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http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/egov, accessed March 12, 2008.

20

From the interview with the Chairman of Industry Advisory Council (IAC) on July 13, 2007
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The Fund shall be administered by the Administrator of the General Services Administration, assisted by the
Administrator of the Office of E-Government.
22 § 3604. E-Government Fund of the E-Government Act of 2002
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Second, the Office of e-Government strengthened its collaboration with the budget office of the
OMB. The two offices held regular meetings based on the E-Government Act of 2002 and discussed
the status of e-government initiatives and budget allocations for them. This collaboration provided the
institutional background for the ‘budget power’ of the Office of e-Government. That is, the budget
threats were, to counter the resistance from agencies who were against the OMB’s e-government
policy principles, have been used through the linkage of e-government initiatives and budget
process.23
Thirdly, the evaluation frameworks of the e-government initiatives were linked to budget
allocations. The results of the evaluations were directly reflected in the up-coming year’s budget
because they were carried out by the OMB. Hence the two types of the managerial tools have had a
synergetic effect on performance management of e-government initiatives (Yoon & Lee, 2005).

C. Tools based on persuasion
The Office of E-government joined established committees and made new forums which were
responsible for enhancing the degree of collaboration and sharing of experiences and information
among federal agencies. First, the Office participated in the established committees. For example, it
established a partnership with the President’s Management Council (PMC) whose members consisted
of high-ranking officials in federal agencies. Mr. Mark Forman, the first administrator in the Office of
E-Government, let the members of the PMC participate in important decision-making processes, such
as the selection of e-government initiatives, serving as representatives of each federal agency. In
taking this approach, he tried to establish the political legitimacy of e-government policy.
In addition, the CIO council served as a cross-agency forum used to discuss e-government
promotion. The Administrator of the Office should lead activities of the Council on behalf of the
Deputy Director of Management, a chairperson of the Council according to the E-government Act of
2002. The members of the CIO council also participated in a steering committee for the Office of Egovernment, which was intended to enhance collaboration related to e-government policy (OMB,
2002).

2425

Second, the Office established new committees and forums. For example, it formed ‘Portfolio
Steering Committees’ which served under the Administrator. The Committee members “were from
agencies that make up the project teams for each of the initiatives. And the steering committees will

23

From the interview with the professor of computer science who had participated in the working group of an
e-government initiative on June 22, 2007
24 http://www.cio.gov, accessed March 11, 2008
25

According to the news article of Washington Technology (Jan. 4, 2002), Mr. Mark Forman had invested much
time and had made great efforts to keep good relations with the members of the PMC and the CIO Council.
21

advise agency program managers concerning their initiatives and help remove barriers to the
implementation of the initiatives.” (OMB, 2002) In addition, the Office set the forum for each
initiative. For example, Chief Architect Forum (CAF) was newly formed by the Office to encourage
chief architects of agencies to share their experiences and advise the Federal Chief Architect at the
Office throughout the course of implementing the FEA.

(3) Organizational Arrangements

A. Public Organizations
Diverse public organizations had participated in the e-government building process, carrying out
their own functions as illustrated in <Table 1>. In addition, the departments or the agencies which
were concerned with the e-government initiatives were designated ‘Managing Partners’ of the
initiatives. For example, the Department of Education was the Managing Partner of ‘Online Access
for Loans’, which was one of the initiatives of the ‘Government for Customers (G4C)’ area. The
Managing Partners took charge of supporting implementation of e-government and mobilizing
resources (OMB, 2002).

<Table 1> Roles and Responsibilities of Federal Agencies
Agency
Department
Commerce(NIST)

Functions
of

General
Service
Administration (GSA)
Office of Personnel
Management
(OPM)
Office of Federal
Procurement
Policy (OFPP)
Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA)

Each federal agency

- Establishing policies for IT standards
-

Administrating E-Government Fund
Supporting CIO Council
Providing framework for interoperability of electronic signature
Analyzing the personnel needs related to IT and IRM
Identifying demand of information resource management, training,
personnel needs
- overseeing training methods and training on IT
- assessing the training of Federal employees in IT disciplines
- Developing effective e-procurement
- Supporting the innovative e-procurement policy
- Administrate information policy for federal government
- Collaborating with Office of e-Government on e-government policy
such as capital planning and investment control; the development of
EA; information security; privacy; etc.
- Complying with the requirements of the E-Government Act of 2002
- Ensuring that the information resource management policies and
guidance established
- Supporting the e-government policy of OMB and GSA
22

-

Developing performance measures of e-government
Avoiding diminishing access
Enhancing the accessibility to people with disabilities
Sponsoring activities that use information technology to engage the
public in the development and implementation of policies and
programs
- Making and submitting E-Government Status Report
- Taking responsibility to use or manage IT to deliver government
information and services
Source: E-Government Act of 2002

The Office of E-Government assumed a leadership role for e-government building in the Bush
administration. It was delegated its managerial tools via the legal framework and supported by the
PMC as well as other OMB staffs, members of the CIO, CFO, and Procurement Executive and
Human Resources Councils.
In order to enhance its leadership, daily management and coordination, the Office of EGovernment set its organizational structure as follows. First, the Office hired four Portfolio Managers
for each of the four citizen segments: G2C, G2B, G2G, and Internal Efficiency and Effectiveness
(IEE). Each portfolio manager reported to the Associate Director for E-Government and IT, who was
responsible for overseeing progress in the field of E-Government initiatives. To promote coordination
among e-government initiatives, portfolio steering groups were formed to focus on E-Government in
cooperation with other federal management councils, federal agencies, local governments and the CIO
Council. The Committees also support their corresponding portfolio manager, an OMB employee,
who is responsible for making government more citizen-centered through daily interaction with the
managing partners who they oversee (OMB, 2002).

B. Private Organizations
The Office of e-Government institutionalized the following linkage with private sector. Through
these institutionalized linkages, the Office imported the knowledge and the experiences it had
accumulated regarding the adoption IT in the private sector and the policy advice it had received from
the private sector as well (Saint-Martin, 2005). Initially, supporting contractors supported the policydecision makers in the Office.26 The members of the supporting contractors were all people with a
great deal of professional expertise in IT and additionally had MBA degrees. They made contracts
with the Office and had supported “everything of the Office” directly and constantly in the

26

Major supporting contractors in the field of e-government were Booz Allen Hamilton and SRA International.
From the interview with the consultants supporting the OMB on July 12, 2007
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neighboring rooms.27 Their role in the course of drafting the ‘E-Government Strategy’28 of the OMB
in 2001 serves as a good example to illustrate their role in the process. They provided the
methodology used in analyzing the functions and the status of IT in federal agencies, conducted
surveys on the opinions of interested parties, developed a performance index of e-government
initiatives, and provided policy alternatives, etc.
Secondly, the Industry Advisory Council (IAC) also supported the Office. The IAC, one of the
partners of the Office, is a non-profit organization whose members number about 400 IT companies.
Its goal was to share professional experiences and information in order to promote communication,
and increase the degree of trust in IT among public officials and entrepreneurs in the IT field.29 The
IAC provided the best practice for IT adoption and IT governance in the private sector and research
results on e-government initiatives. By forming Shared Interest Groups (SIGs), it encouraged the
consultants and researchers of private IT companies to draft working papers on e-government policy
on topics such as short-term and long-term policy issues like the modification of IT adoption in the
private sector, strategy and governance structure of e-government policy, and reactions to the current
issues of e-government policy. The papers were delivered to decision-makers of the Office and
referred to in the policy process.30

2) The E-Government Policy Structures of the Roh Administration in Korea

(1) Legal Framework

Since the Korean government started to build e-government in earnest in the early 1990s, several
laws were enacted for the construction of e-government. And different rules gave authority for egovernment promotion to different ministries (Yoo and Yoon, 2005; Phang, 2002). In the Roh
administration, the situation continued to be unchanged. The Framework Act on Informatization
Promotion enacted in 1996 gave the authority to the Ministry of Information and Communication
(MIC) and let the MIC create National Computerization Agency (NCA), one of the quasigovernmental organizations (QUAGOs), which were responsible for implementing IT policy and egovernment promotion. But the E-Government Act enacted in 2001 gave the authority to the
MoGAHA. In addition, the Government Organization Act, which was amended in 1999, delegated

27

From the interview with the consultant supporting the OMB on July 10 and 12, 2007

28

The ‘E-Government Strategy’ contained the e-government initiatives of the Bush administration, strategy and
future direction for promoting e-government, and performance indicators and milestones of e-government policy.
29 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/egov, accessed March 12, 2008.
30

From the interview with the chairman of the IAC on July 13, 2007
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functions of government reform to the Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB), which resulted in the
MPB officials arguing that they should take charge of the e-government promotion.31 Moreover,
President Roh’s Presidential Decree on the Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and
Decentralization (PCGID) prescribed the PCGID should take charge of e-government promotion in
particular. Based on the decree, E-Government Special Committee (hereafter Special Committee), one
of the 5 special committees of the PCGID, was created and plans for e-government promotion were
drafted, initiatives selected, and coordination pursued during the initial stage of the Roh
administration. These measures also applied to the BRM and the GITA.
In this situation, the Korean government amended the Government Organization Act in 2004 in
order to adjust government agencies’ functions and authorities of e-government promotion. As a result
of the amendments, the MoGAHA was put in charge of e-government promotion. In addition, the
Presidential Decree was amended so that the Special Committee was changed to an advisory
committee, thus causing it to lose all of its authority for e-government promotion.
However, there conflicts between the MoGAHA and the MIC persisted after the amendment of
the Government Organization Act because the Act still tasked the MIC with the functions of building
and managing the information technology and information policy. Based on these articles, the MIC
continuously argued its authority in the technological aspects of e-government promotion. 32
Furthermore, there were no institutional changes regarding financial and organizational resources for
e-government building after the amendment of the Government Organization Act. The MPB still
maintained the budget authority over e-government. In addition, the MIC still maintained many of the
quasi-governmental organizations (QUAGOs) in IT policy and e-government promotion such as NCA,
based on the Framework Act on Informatization Promotion.
In conclusion, the diverse authorities for e-government building such as planning, implementing,
technology, budget, and coordination were not concentrated and instead splintered into the several
agencies. Unclear and contradictory articles of the several rules were one of the sources for the ‘turf
war’ among agencies and that led to weakening control and coordination power in the field of egovernment building (Hwang, 2006).

(2) Managerial Tools for Control and Coordination

31

From the interview on December 13, 2007 with the consultant who joined the e-government initiative of Kim
Dae-Jung administration, the former administration of the Roh administration
32 The President Roh tried to define the roles of the MoGAHA and the MIC as follows: the MoGAHA should
take the roles of the CIO; and the MIC the roles of CTO (Chief Technology Officer) in Korean government
(Song, 2004). However, his definition did not resolve the ‘turf war’ between the two ministries because the line
between “the CIO and the CTO never got clear.” From the interview with the Head of Staff of the EGovernment Special Committee on May 27, 2008
25

A. Tools based on authority
A comprehensive e-government performance evaluation system was not established in the Roh
administration. One of the reasons for this was the conflict over who should take charge of
evaluations related to e-government initiatives. These conflicts were related to the ambiguity of legal
frameworks. Each agency argued its own legitimacy about why it should take charge of the evaluation
based on the acts which gave it the authority of e-government promotion. At last, the Special
Committee carried out evaluations on 11 initiatives out of a total 31 initiatives and the MoGAHA
carried out the other 20, using different evaluation frameworks (Yoon, 2007).
In addition to inter-agency disagreements, there were other reasons for the fragmentation of
evaluation systems. Firstly, President Roh wanted to reform the overall evaluation system of
government affairs. Over the course of the changes, the roles and responsibilities of e-government
evaluation became unclear. Not only the agencies related to e-government building, but also other
agencies such as the Committee of Policy Evaluation were created and it attempted to take charge of
e-government performance evaluations. Secondly, we can point out the delay of drafting the plans for
e-government more than expected. This consequently resulted in delays related to setting egovernment evaluation systems. For these reasons, the evaluations were limited to process evaluations
based on the qualitative indicators of evaluations (PCGID, 2005).

B. Tools based on budget
Overall control and coordination tools based on budget were dismantled in Roh administration.
Firstly, the Informatization Promotion Fund, which had been evaluated as a coordination tool for egovernment building and IT development in Korea, was abolished because of transparency
problems.33 Instead, the budget for e-government building started to come from general accounts of
the annual budget (PCGID, 2005). This meant that financial discretion for control and coordination of
e-government promotion was limited because the budget of general accounts is less flexible than the
Fund (Song and Cho, 2007).
Secondly, the communication channels for cooperation with budget office were closed. For
example, the MoGAHA, one of the main authorities for e-government promotion, didn’t have

33

The Informatization Promotion Fund was for enhancing the informatization of the government and society,
building information infrastructure, and developing IT industry and R&D etc. This fund was relatively free from
the control of National Assembly than general budget. That is, the discretion of the executive branch in
assigning the fund to the programs was bigger than the general budget. The two administration before the Roh
administration used this Fund as grants for the IT industry and the R&D for information technology. In addition,
it was used for enhancing the coordination and control between the National Informatization Plans and the
demand of each government agency. Each agency should follow the Plan authorized by the MIC for getting this
fund (Song and Cho, 2007; Hong, 2003; Hwang, 2003).
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effective communication channels with the budget office of the MPB.34 The Special Committee also
“did not exert formal/informal influence on the allocation of the budget and was not involved in the
budget allocation process” (PCGID, 2005).35 Consequently, collaboration with the MPB, the central
budget agency, became increasingly weaker with the amendment of the Government Organization Act.

C. Tools based on Persuasion
The Special Committee itself was established for enhancing persuasion and coordination among
government agencies, especially among the major departments related to e-government. Thus the
directors of the MoGAHA, the MIC and the MPB were included as members of ministries along with
members from private sector. However, the directors of the MoGAHA and the MIC were in conflict
even during meetings of the Special Committee.36 Additionally the director of the MPB had a low
attendance rate.37
It is said that there were no other effective forums for sharing information and experiences
related to e-government building among agencies. However, the Special Committee had several subcommittees which were established according service field. The team leaders were members of the
Special Committee and high-ranked officials of ministries participated in the sub-committees. It was
said that these sub-committees restrictively enhanced the communications and collaboration among
ministries in the course of e-government building.38

(3) Organizational Arrangements

A. Public Organizations
Several public organizations had participated in the e-government building process. As seen in
the sections of legal framework, the Special Committee, the MoGAHA and the MIC were the major
actors in the process. The MPB was another important actor because it possessed budget power. In
addition, other government agencies participated in e-government initiatives following the guidance
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From the interview with senior researcher of the National Computerization Agency on February 6, 2008
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In the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the Special Committee for e-Government was actively involved in the
budget allocation process and urged to assign more fund to the e-government programs. The committee
exercised formal and informal influence to the budget office and let the officials in the bureau of government
reform in the MPB, the members of the Committee, argued the importance of e-government to the budget office
in the MPB (Special Committee for e-Government, 2003).
36 From the interview with the Head of Staff of the E-Government Special Committee on May 27, 2008
37

According to the analysis of the minutes of the Committee, the rates of the attendance of the directors of the
MoGAHA and the MIC were 96.7 and 86.8. However, that of the MPB was 42.7.
38 The CIO Council of Korean government was formed but it was not active. From the interview with the Head
of Staff of the E-Government Special Committee on May 27, 2008
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and technological advice of the Special Committee, the MoGAHA, and the MIC.
Under the ambiguous legal frameworks pertaining to what organizations should take charge of
the e-government policy, there were various conflicts. Specifically, the conflict between the
MoGAHA and the MIC was ‘big problem’ in implementing e-government initiatives (Yoo and Yoon,
2005). The MoGAHA and the MIC had tried to extend their own control and power over egovernment initiatives because they believed that they would not survive in the next administration
without taking charge of e-government authority.39
In this situation, the Special Committee did not have the authority or resources needed to control
and coordinate the MoGAHA and the MIC. A large portion of the members of the Special Committee
were university professors. Moreover, the number of the administrative staff was just 5 or 6.40 Thus
the characteristics of the Special Committee resembled that of a temporary organization. Hence it was
nearly impossible to coordinate and mediate the conflicts between government agencies.
Moreover, the Special Committee was also in conflict with the MoGAHA. That is, the roles of
the Special Committee, as the coordinator and planner of e-government policy, were in conflict with
the MoGAHA’s authority after the amendment of the Government Organization Act. The MoGAHA
didn’t accept the legitimacy of the Special Committee’s authority to coordinate. At last, the Special
Committee lost its authority to plan and coordinate and thus transformed into just an ‘advisory
committee’ for e-government policy (MoGAHA, 2007).

B. Private Organizations
In Korea, many IT vendors joined the in the process of the e-government system implementation.
However, their roles were limited to just system implementation and consequently they did not have
influence over policy-making. One of the interesting aspects of the Korean case was the role of the
National Computerization Agency (NCA), one of the quasi-governmental organizations (QUAGOs) in
the IT policy field. The NCA mediated between the government and private sector. The NCA has
supported policy-making by providing related knowledge and policy options and also helped with
implementing IT policy. In the Roh administration, the NCA supported the Special Committee by
providing staff and managing e-government initiatives (NCA, 2007).
However, with the change of the e-government policy structure after the amendment of the
Government Organization Act, there were some cracks which developed between the MoGAHA and
the NCA. The MoGAHA, which was the new main agency of e-government policy, did not want to
39
40

From the interview with a staff of the E-Government Special Committee on May 21, 2008

The Committee consisted of around 20 members. 13-15 of them came from private sector, mainly
universities. And the directors of the MoGAHA, the MIC and the MPB who concerned with e-government
promotion joined as members of the committee. The committee was supported by 5-6 administrative staffs
(PCGID, 2005).
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cooperate with the NCA because the NCA was one of the QUAGOs which operated under the MIC
(Yoo and Yoon, 2005) Because there had been serious conflict between the MoGAHA and the MIC,
the MoGAHA did not want to work with the NCA either, and tried to establish a new QUAGO which
fell under its control. These unfriendly relations between the two agencies brought about implicit
problems in the collaboration between these two agencies. The MoGAHA did not accept the the
NCA’s support and the NCA did not provide better policy alternatives to the MoGAHA and were
reluctant to follow MoGAHA’s order. These conflicts prevented the knowledge and experiences of the
NCA from being transferred to the e-government policy process (Song and Cho, 2007).

2. Analysis of the BRM Buildings in the U.S. and Korea

1) The BRM Building in the U.S

(1) Planning Stage

In planning stage, the FEA including the BRM was selected as an e-government initiative and
plans for developing the BRM and its draft version were made. The OMB took the initiative related to
making the BRM and was backed by several federal agencies. President Bush had made “Expanding
E-Government” integral to a five-part Management Agenda for making government more focused on
citizens and results. Consequently, the OMB formed a task force team which was charged with
making plans and roadmaps for e-government building on August 9, 2001.The tasks of the team were
to create an e-government strategy, to select e-government initiatives, to form an e-governance
structure, and to make working plans. This task force team consisted of OMB staff members and civil
servants from federal agencies and reported the E-Government strategy to the Director of the OMB on
February 17, 2002 (OMB, 2002).
In the course of working, the team made and utilized “An Integrated Government-wide Business
Architecture”, the draft version of the current BRM, to identify the federal government functions and
to find the opportunities for simplifying the federal government’s business process (FEMPMO, 2002).
Moreover, the task force decided to develop the FEA. The FEA, which includes the BRM, “supports
all of the initiatives, will map government processes by line of business. It will develop information,
data and application interface standards to eliminate redundancies and yield improved operating
efficiency and effectiveness.”(OMB, 2002)
However, there was skepticism and resistances over the OMB’s promotion of cross-agency egovernment and the FEA. The federal agencies had complaints about the OMB’s position to build
new cross-agency information systems because it made federal agencies consolidate their information
29

systems in the new cross-agency systems or cancel plans for building new information systems for
their agency.41 Especially, “the FEA covering the whole government” was ambiguous and unfamiliar
to the federal agencies.42 Some IT specialists from federal agencies were extremely cynical to the
feasibility of such an initiative.43
However, the resistance and cynicism were not explicit because it was just in the planning stage
and the federal agencies were concerned that resistance to OMB’s policy would result in
disadvantages in terms of budget allocations.44 In addition, to enhance the understandability of the
BRM and the FEA and to clarify issues, the OMB used various meetings and councils in the federal
government. First, the OMB received approval by the PMC for its initiatives. Second, the CIO council
supported the OMB’s activities in addition to the government-wide forum for sharing information
related toe-government policy.
In initiating the BRM and the FEA, supporting contractors and the IAC were actively engaged in
the process. First, supporting contractors consisted of around 10 consultants from consulting firms,
who supported several activities of the task force team. Specifically, their major means of support for
the task force team were as follows: (1) raising issues about the necessity and importance of the BRM
and the FEA; (2) providing the methodology for surveying the each agency’s functions; (3) analyzing
the linkage between the functions; (4) making the pilot BRM and adopting it to analyzing the IT
systems in federal government.45
Second, outside of the OMB, the IAC was asked to research the FEA and the BRM which was
modified for federal government, as well as to identify best practices in private sector, by the OMB.46
For the research, the IAC formed EA SIG in which over 100 IT companies participated.47 The
working papers which contained the research findings were delivered to the OMB and referred to in
carrying out the BRM and the FEA. Furthermore, the supporting contractors and the IAC were
networked. For example, the consulting firms of the supporting contractors joined the IAC and
actively participated in the EA SIG.

(2) Developing Stage
41

From the interview with the professor of computer science who had participated in the working group of an
e-government initiative on June 22, 2007
42 From the telephone interview with the CIO of the National Science Foundation (NSF) on June 29, 2007
43

From the interview with Federal Chief Architect of the OMB on July10, 2007

44

From the interview with the professor of computer science who had participated in the working group of an
e-government initiative on June 22, 2007

45

From the interview with the consultant who were supporting the OMB on July 10 and 12, 2007

46

From the interview with the Chairman of Industry Advisory Council (IAC) on July 13, 2007

47http://www.iaconline.org/portal,

assessed March 5, 2008.
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The BRM was established with several sub-tasks, such as surveying and categorizing the federal
agencies’ functions, linking the functions between information systems of the federal government, and
receiving feedback from agencies etc. As a result of these activities, the 1st version of the BRM had
been unveiled in July, 2002, and it had been revised to the current version which was published in
June, 2003 (FEAPMO, 2002; 2003).
The OMB took the initiative in developing stage too. This was due to the fact that the Office of
e-Government was created and was given the authority to implement and oversee the development of
enterprise architectures within and across agencies.48 That is, the role of the FEA within and across
agencies was outlined by laws such as the ITMRA and E-Government Act of 2002, so the federal
agencies had no choice but to follow the OMB’s policy directions.49
In order to develop the BRM and to manage the FEA initiative, the Federal Enterprise
Architecture Program Management Office (FEAPMO) and the new position of ‘Chief Architect’ were
created in the Office. The FEAPMO had taken on the roles of making and disseminating the
principles and the regulations of the BRM as well as of managing the initiative.
During the implementation of the BRM, the Office established various control and coordination
tools. Firstly, the Office had institutionalized the BRM in the budget process by revising OMB
Circular A-11, which had regulated the budget process (FEAPMO, 2003). For example, when the
federal agencies submit budget requests to the OMB, they must link IT investments in the budget
requests with the code numbers of the functions in the BRM, which the IT investments would support.
Through this revision, the OMB tried to discover any redundancies in IT investment on the one hand,
and increase the level of usage of the BRM on the other hand. Consequently, this revision forced
federal agencies to use the BRM because the federal agencies could not submit the budget requests to
the OMB without using the BRM.
Secondly, the Office shared information and knowledge and tried to coordinate the activities of
the FEA and the BRM through the CIO Council and other committees. For example, the ‘Chief
Architect Forum (CAF)’ which was composed of chief architects of agencies was formed to share
their experiences of architecture activities (Seifert, 2006).50Additionally the CIO Council formed the
Architecture and Infrastructure Committee (AIC) whose purposes were as follows: “(1) to integrate
OMB and CIO Council EA efforts; (2) to facilitate simpler, consistent EA taxonomy and terminology;
(3) to facilitate cross-agency efforts; (4) to operationalize EA efforts and developed the principles and

48

116 STAT. 2902, 2903

49

From the telephone interview with the CIO of the National Science Foundation (NSF) on June 29, 2007

50

From the telephone interview with the Chief Architect of the National Science Foundation (NSF) on June 29,
2007
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regulations on the FEA.” (FEAPMO, 2004)
The supporting contractors and the IAC supported the Office in the developing stage. Firstly, the
supporting contractors supported all the activities of the FEAPMO. They joined in the development of
the BRM and the FEA51 and aided decision makers of the Office by surveying various perspectives
on the BRM, finding solutions to the problems, and analyzing the status of the BRM building.52
Second, the IAC conducted research and provided the Office with working papers regarding solutions
to technical problems such as the linkage between the BRM and the budget process, as well as to
alternatives on the revision of the OMB circular A-11.

(3) Adoption Stage

The BRM had been adopted by the federal government and used for managing information assets
and budget allocation since June, 2003. In addition, other reference models based on the BRM were
built and adopted by the agencies. And the budget process for the fiscal year of 2004 started with
institutionalizing the BRM in the process (FEAPMO, 2003).
However, there were conflicts and criticisms regarding the BRM and the FEA as follows.53
Firstly, the BRM and the FEA required the staff of the agencies to perform a great amount of paper
work. The agencies then had to submit “stacks of paper as tall as a person” in following with the
51

Booz Allen Hamilton, one of the supporting contractors for making the BRM and the FEA, supported the
FEAPMO including the production of: Five interrelated Reference Models to facilitate collaboration and
communication; Detailed guidance to help federal agencies comply with FEA requirements included in OMB
Circular A-11; The FEA Management System (FEAMS), an Internet-based EA tool to aid FEA analysis,
maintenance, planning, and architecture development; Component-Based Architecture (CBA) and subsequent
Services and Component-Based Architecture (SCBA) specifications to support the use of reusable components
and services; The Solution Development Life Cycle (SDLC) methodology that creates and deploys solutions
using a component-based approach; The charter and operating principles to support the Solutions Architects
Working Group, which assists agencies in designing e-Gov initiatives; Communications and outreach activities.
From http://www.boozallen.com/consulting, assessed on 15 August, 2008
52 Tim Wang had worked for the Office as a member of the supporting contractors. He won award of ‘2007
Federal 100 Winners’ from the FCW.Com for his contributions to e-government development. The FCW.Com
presented the explanation for his award as follows: “Tim Wang, principal consultant at SRA Touchstone
Consulting Group, provided exceptional contactor support and continuity to the Office of Management and
Budget's Office of E-Government and Information Technology during a time of high turnover among key
portfolio managers. Wang has worked at OMB since 2003, when the e-government initiatives were new, and he
has gathered a wide range of perspectives. Although the manager positions were empty, Wang attended all
portfolio meetings so that he could relay important issues to senior OMB officials to keep the office running
smoothly. Wang also volunteered his expertise to OMB officials who were updating OMB Circular A-11 to
improve the federal budgeting process. Wang's efforts helped organize an annual flood of information from
departments and agencies. Although contractors do as they are told, "consultants do that and then some," said
Tim Young, associate administrator for e-government and IT at OMB.” From the above explanation, we can get
hints about the concrete activities of the supporting contractors and the organizational mood of the Office.
53 Refer to Fountain (2004) on the details of the key issues of the FEA. In this paper, the author is providing the
criticisms which were found through the interviews and presentation of the civil servants who were concerned
with the FEA and the BRM.
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BRM and other reference models, and those activities were time-consuming and labor-consuming
jobs.54 Secondly, these criticisms generated doubt over whether the BRM and the FEA would be
beneficial to the agencies and enhance the IT manageability of the federal government. Some agencies
criticized the BRM, which to them existed merely to enhance the efficiency of budget control by the
OMB, and not for the agencies’ IT management.55 Thirdly, conflicts existed between the BRM and
other managerial tools of the OMB. The performance evaluation systems such as Scorecard system
and Program Assessment Rating Tools (PART) system were agency-centered programs, but the BRM
was intended for cross-agency collaborations. Therefore, the agency didn’t have any incentives to
follow the BRM.56 Fourthly, some technical problems were also found. For example, it was difficult
for the agency to link just one function in the BRM to IT systems, or the agency could not determine
the exact function which the IT systems were charged with supporting because some IT systems
pursued several purposes and supported several functions of the BRM.57
Responses of the Office to such resistance and criticism can be summarized by the adage “small
carrots and big sticks.”58 In terms of the small carrots, the Office tried to share experiences and the
knowledge of the BRM through the CIO Council and the CAF. In addition, many kinds of guidelines
and case studies for using the BRM and the FEA were disseminated to the agencies. Those
publications had the purpose of enhancing agencies’ understanding of the BRM and FEA.
However, the big sticks were more effective than the small carrots. First of all, the office made
‘The Enterprise Architecture Assessment Framework’ and evaluated the agencies’ EA status annually.
It allowed not only agencies to rate the status of the EA, but also permitted the Office to discuss and
become involved in the agencies’ EA practices.59 Moreover, the result of the assessment began to be
included in the Scorecard framework from June 30, 2005.60 Secondly, the Office used the tool of
‘budget power’. On the one hand, the Office stressed the possibility of disadvantages in terms of the
budget such as the use of budget suspension rights for agencies which resisted the OMB’s policy
direction while on the other hand they allocated other funds in exchange for accepting the OMB’s
54

From the presentation of Norman J. Jacknis, CIO of Westchester County "Digital Government: Westchester
County, New York, and the Role of the CIO", hosted by National Center for Digital Government, the University
of Massachusetts Amherst on April 12, 2007
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From the interview with Federal Chief Architect of the OMB on July10, 2007
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From the interview with Federal Chief Architect of the OMB on July10, 2007
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In addition to this criticism and resistance from inside of executive branch, Congress checked the BRM and

FEA programs through the EA maturity assessments by GAO (GAO, 2004).
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From the interview with the consultant supporting the OMB on July 10 and 12, 2007

59

From the testimony of the Karen Evans, the second Administrator of the Office of E-Government, before the
sub-committee on technology, information policy, intergovernmental relations, and the census, the U.S. House
of Representative on May 19, 2004
60 From World Technology News, May 13, 2005
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direction.61
In the adoption stage, the private partners of the Office supported the Office. For example, the
supporting contractors established guidelines and provided case studies for using the BRM and the
FEA. In addition, they carried out projects for calculating the Returns of Investment (ROI) of the FEA
initiatives. The IAC supported the Office in its research and creation of prototypes for the Enterprise
Architecture Assessment Framework.62

2) The BRM Building in Korea

(1) Planning Stage

In the planning stages, the Korean BRM was officially selected as one of the ‘core’ e-government
initiatives of the Roh administration in August, 2003 (PCGID, 2005). Before officially selecting the
BRM as an e-government initiative, the U.S. BRM and the FEA had been benchmarked and a pilot
project for checking the feasibility of the BRM in the Korean context was carried out.
At this stage, the Special Committee took the initiative based on the Presidential Decree on the
PCGID. The Special Committee created a ‘roadmap’ and implementation plan for e-government
promotion, selected initiatives, and exercised coordination power for e-government building based on
the Presidential Decree.63
The Special Committee established a consensus regarding model-driven e-government
promotion in order to overcome the ‘stove-piped’ e-government and enhance the usefulness of the
BRM as a model for promoting function-oriented e-government. From this viewpoint, the Special
Committee defined the BRM as “a systemic model for analyzing government functions from the
perspective of informatization to overcome the stove-piped systems of traditional government
operations.” In addition, it set the principles that all of the e-government initiatives should be carried
out after building the BRM (PCGID, 2005).
In this stage, the Special Committee was supported by the NCA.64 One example of activities
performed by the NCA was translating reports published by the U.S. federal government related to the

61
62

From the interview with Federal Chief Architect and consultant of the OMB on July10 and 12, 2007

From the interview with the consultant for the OMB on July12, 2007 and the Chairman of IAC on July 13,
2007
63 In addition to the legal framework, the strong empowerment of the President Roh was another foundation of
the PCGID and the Special Committee in the field of government reform and e-government building. From the
interview with the staff of the E-Government Special Committee on May 21, 2008
64 The head of the Committee, Dr. Sam-Young Seo was also the president of the NCA. Consequently, the ties
between the two agencies became stronger than before.
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U.S. BRM. In addition, conferences and forums on the EA and the BRM were co-sponsored by the
NCA and the association of IT companies. Furthermore, the NCA carried out the pilot project for the
Korean BRM. The goals of the pilot project were to check the expected problems and the effects of
adopting the U.S. BRM in advance and to examine what point of the U.S. BRM should be modified to
enhance the chances of success after being adopted by the Korean government (NCA, 2003a; 2003b).
These activities of the NCA had been conducted in cooperation with IT specialists of private
companies. For example, the pilot project’s task force team was composed of the NCA researchers
and consultants from IT companies.65
Consequently, the Special Committee wrote detailed implementation plans which stated that the
Special Committee itself should manage the initiative directly and should coordinate its efforts with
other agencies in the government. In addition, the NCA was to be designated a managing partner of
the BRM according to these plans. This is to say that the Special Committee should make decisions
and coordinate its efforts with regards to problems which would occur in pursuit of the BRM. Lastly
the NCA was to also conduct research and development for the Korean BRM.66
However, there was skepticism and criticisms regarding the plans from other government
agencies. Much of the skepticism and criticism stemmed from the MoGAHA and the MIC not fully
understanding the purposes of the BRM. Moreover, the MoGAHA whose functions included those of
personnel and organizational management was highly critical about the feasibility of BRM
construction, pointing out that the academic professors of the Special Committee did not know the
realities of the Korean government. One of the high-ranked officials of the agency said that a
function-oriented structure, independent of the organization, would not be feasible in the Korean
context because the Korean government had a strong organization-orientation. However, the
skepticism and criticisms were not revealed openly due to the great degree of power the Special
Committee possessed and strong support of President Roh on the BRM.67

(2) Developing Stage

The BRM was created via the BPR/ISP project from August to November, 2004 and the
Implementation project from May to November, 2005. In the BPR/ISP project, the functions of the
government agencies and their attributes were investigated. And then, the functions were categorized
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From the interview with the consultants on December 13, 2007 and the NCA researchers who participated in
the pilot project on February 20, 2008
66 From the ‘Detail Implementation Plan for e-Government Promotion’ published by the E-Government Special
Committee in March, 2004.
67 From the interview with the Head of the staffs of the E-Government Special Committee on May 21, 2008
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according to a five-level hierarchical structure. At the end of the BPR/ISP project, the BRM consisted
of the 20 first-level functions, 78 second-level functions, and 188 third-level functions. However,
these numbers were modified during the Implementation project. After the Implementation project,
the BRM was composed of 22 first-level functions, 82 second-level functions and 339 third-level
functions.
Furthermore, there were changes to the content of the initiatives which were outlined by the
original BRM plans. Firstly, the scope of the project was reduced. The BRM had been a governmentwide model for building a cross-agency e-government. However, in the developing stages, it had
become one of the sub-systems of the HAMONY system, which was a new government-wide
management information system. Consequently, the original plan of ‘launching the e-government
initiatives after the construction of BRM’ was abandoned (PCGID, 2005).
Secondly and more importantly than the first change, the categorization of the functions
independent of the organizations was not realized. In developing the BRM, the functions of the
agencies were simply arranged by the organizations. There were no linkages or integration of the
functions and no examination about similarities between the functions carried out by different
agencies.
In the developing stage, the MoGAHA took the initiative because it had been given the authority
of e-government promotion thanks to the amendment of the Government Organization Act. In
addition, the ITA Act, which had been newly enacted in December, 2005 for ITA activities, delegated
the authority of building and managing the ITA of government agencies to MoGAHA. Thus, this
agency was able to manage the BRM projects and had powers to accept the project results outlined
above.68
The Special Committee was informed of the results of the BRM projects and sometimes made
comments on the results of the projects. However, the Special Committee did not raise the issues very
actively and the Committee’s comments on the projects were underestimated and not fully accepted
by the MoGAHA. After the amendment of the Government Organization Act, the control and
coordination authorities of the Special Committee became much weaker than before, a problem which
was enhanced by the fact that the Special Committee had no managerial tools. “It (the Special
Committee) did not have financial resources for control and coordination and manpower enough to
manage the BRM initiative, one of the biggest e-government initiatives.” The Special Committee not
only had authority, but also the tools and resources for carrying out the initiatives, unlike the
expectations which were outlined during the planning stage (PCGID, 2005).
68

“The MoGAHA had dealt with organizational management of Korean government. Such an organizationcentric perspective had been deeply embedded in the MoGAHA, and it was also reflected on the BRM
structure.” From the interview with the head of the staff of the E-Government Special Committee on May 21,
2008
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The NCA also could not influence the construction of the BRM. Rather, its roles were
constrained to the practical and detailed management of the project, such as Requests for Proposals
(RFP), making contracts with companies and managing the procedures for the projects.

(3) Adoption Stage

At this stage, the BRM was adopted and spread to all government agencies via the HAMONY
system from October, 2005. The MoGAHA was numerous types of authority for e-government
promotion through the amended Government Organization Act and the ITA Act at this stage. In
contrast, the main purpose of the Special Committee was changed to give advice to the President by
the amendment of the Presidential Decree of the PCGID in January, 2006. Under this amendment, not
only all the functions and the authorities of the Special Committee for e-government promotions, but
also the right of recommending five of the thirteen committee members from the private sector were
given to the MoGAHA (PCGID, 2005).69
However, the MoGAHA did not exercise any actual control and coordination power during the
adoption stage in spite of the amendments of the laws. The reasons were as follows. First, the MIC
and the MPB maintained their authority over the e-government policy although the Government
Organization Act delegated authority to the MoGAHA for e-government promotion. The Government
Organization Act also gave a role and responsibilities to the MIC in e-government policy. In addition,
the MPB still maintained budget power for e-government promotion.
Second, the MoGAHA did not have actual managerial tools available for control and
coordination. Due to the abolishment of the IT Promotion Fund for e-government building, the
MoGAHA did not have financial resources either. Moreover, the evaluation systems of e-government
initiatives had been not set up since President Roh had come to office. There were also no forums
which could be used for persuading agencies or asking for cooperation with the MPB and the MIC.70
The spread of the BRM to all government agencies brought various coordination problems. One
of the biggest tasks was the integration of the BRM and other function categorization frameworks in
other information systems.71 For example, a new financial management system, of which managing
partner was the MPB, had its own function categorization system for operation related to financial
69

One of the reasons of the amendment of the Presidential Decree was the conflict between the Committee and
the MoGAHA on some e-government initiatives (PCGID, 2005).
70 Of course, the high-ranked officials of the MIC and the MPB were the members from government agencies
of the advisory committee. But the MPB officer rarely participated in the meeting of the committee and the MIC
members frequently disagree to the MoGAHA. From the interview with the staff of the E-Government Special
Committee on May 21, 2008
71 The adjustment of the function categories for the integration was carried out from October 2005 to February
2006. From the interview with the staff of the E-Government Special Committee on May 21, 2008
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tasks. A new government document archive system also established a categorization framework for
arranging and saving government documents. However, each categorization system followed different
principles and did not match one another. Specifically, the categorization structure of the financial
management system was organization-oriented with its root category being the ‘ministry’.
Consequently, it was expected that conflicts among the systems would emerge.
In the course of the integration, the MoGAHA could not take any initiative which led to the MPB
taking the initiative instead.72 Naturally the various function structures, including the BRM, were
unified and centered upon the MPB’s budget item structure, which was an organization-centric
structure with a root category of ‘ministry’. Moreover, all the agencies preferred the organizationcentric structure to the function-centric structure.73 Each ministry agreed with the MPB’s stance
because they were concerned over the MPB’s budget power in the process of budget allocations on
one hand. And on the other hand, the agencies believed that the organization-centric structure would
be better because each ministry would secure its own turf under an organization-centric form of
BRM.74 At last, the BRM was modified again so that it had 15 first-level functions, 67 second-level
functions, and 491 third-level functions post-integration.
Responding to the integration of the systems and the agencies’ arguments, the MoGAHA could
not exercise any coordination power. Rather, the MoGAHA gave tacit approval to the MPB’s stance.75
The Special Committee, who was the original planner of the function-driven BRM, had no authority
to intervene in this matter. No committee member tried to re-establish the original purposes of the
BRM and to remind the necessity of the function-driven BRM. Consequently, in the end, the BRM
was changed again so as to have a more explicit organization-centric structure and more third-level
functions than before being reflected the interests of the government agencies.
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From the interview with the staff of the E-Government Special Committee on May 21, 2008

In order to find out the agencies stance, surveys to the government agencies on the direction of the
integration were done several times during that period. From the interview with the staff of the E-Government
Special Committee on May 21, 2008
74 For this reason, most ministries strongly tried to level up their functions. For example, Ministry of Culture
and Tourism argued that some of the forth or five-level functions should be the third-level functions in the
revised BRM. Through it, their functions should be evaluate as more significant and would get more resources
and would be better for organization expansion in the future. From the interview with the Head of the staff of
the E-Government Special Committee on May 28, 2008
75 The MPB and the MoGAHA reached to the agreement to setting organization-centric BRM for following
reasons: (1) building the function-oriented BRM would not be feasible in Korean context; (2) it would take too
much time and too much resources; (3) it could bring strong resistance of other ministries and it would lead to
the overall failure of the e-government building in Roh administration. From the answer to the author’s question
in the ‘Policy and Knowledge Forum’ about the new financial management system hosted by the Graduate
School of Public Administration, Seoul National University in September, 2006
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VI. Conclusion

This study examined the influence of the e-government policy structures on e-government policy
outcomes through a cross-national comparative analysis of the BRM initiatives, which had been
commonly implemented in the U.S. and Korea. The U.S. e-government policy structure with its
concentration of authority, diverse and powerful managerial tools for control and coordination and
leadership from the Office of e-Government over the federal agencies contributed to creating a
function-oriented BRM in accordance with the project’s policy goal.
On the contrary, the Korean counterpart suffered from the fragmented authority, ineffective
managerial tools and confrontations among agencies over the course of BRM building. Consequently,
the Korean government had no choice but to abandon its original plans which thereby resulted in an
organization-oriented form of BRM. In addition, the numbers of the functions had been changed
through the developing and adoption stage as illustrated in <Table 2>.

<Table 2> The Changes of the Numbers of the Functions through the Korean BRM making
Stages

Developing

Adoption

# of the 1st level function

BPR/ISP
(Nov. 2004)
20

Implementation
(Nov. 2005)
22

Integration
(Feb. 2006)
15

# of the 2nd level function

78

82

67

# of the 3rd level function

188

339

491

Projects

Through the analysis of the e-government policy structures and their influence on the process of
BRM initiatives, we can see ‘the powers of institutions’ on e-government policy structures. Based on
the characteristics of institutional arrangements of the policy structures, the interactions among actors
were differently structured in the course of BRM construction. In addition, the different institutional
arrangements of policy structures made the control, coordination powers and activities of the private
experts differentiated in the projects.
Let us now turn our attention to the power of other elements which rival explanations of egovernment outcomes have focused on. Firstly, we can see the powers of the technological factors
have on these cases. According to the technology-centric explanations, adopting the BRM should
determinately affect cross-agency e-government and reduce IT investment redundancy. Along these
lines, it was reported that the U.S. BRM facilitated information sharing among federal agencies and
was helpful in detecting redundant IT initiatives (Rocheleau, 2006: 148-155; OMB, 2002).
Comparing the U.S case with the Korean case, however, we can also see the limitations of the
technology-centric explanations, especially those of technological determinism. As illustrated above,
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the same technology adopted in different counties resulted in different outcomes. These cases seem to
be examples which support the argument that information technology is constructed and implemented
by the mediation of institutional arrangements, not by the extrapolation from the outside of
organizations (Bekkers and Homburg, 2005). In any event, the cases in this study seem to imply that
the institutions could be one of the constraints on achieving the expected outcomes of the IT adoption
and also detrimental to its performance. At this point we can assume that different institutional
arrangements can bring about different outcomes and performance of IT (Adler and Henman, 2005;
Snellen, 2005; Fountain, 2001).
Secondly, we also see the influence of environmental factors on the BRM. For example, changes
in political environment, such as administration changes, seem to have an impact on e-government
policy. The Bush administration, which had emphasized the financial management of government,
brought tighter management tools and financial examination of the e-government initiatives.
When we look at things in greater detail, however, we can find that the environmental factors do
not seem to have direct impact on the e-government outcomes and have same force everywhere (Lynn
et al., 2001; Clemens and Cook, 1999). According to the comparative analysis of this study, the
environmental factors seem to have an influence on e-government outcomes through the mediation of
institutional arrangements such as the e-government policy structure. For example, the change of the
administration had brought changes to the e-government policy structures following the amendment
to the legal frameworks and the adoption of new policy tools in the U.S. These institutional changes
resulted in the concentration of authorities in the Office of e-Government and led to the achievement
of a function-oriented BRM. In Korea, however, the change of administration could not bring about
the same result because it did not create the same kind of institution building. In sum, these cases
appear to be examples which argue that the e-government policy environment influences egovernment results through the mechanisms of institutional changes. That is to say that the
institutional factors have a more direct and powerful effect on policy results than environmental
factors.
In addition, it is believed that this study shows reveals some limitations related to the impact of
globalization, which is another environmental factor on e-government policy outcomes. According to
globalization theorists, globalization can cause the policies of one nation to be diffused to other
countries and lead to a convergence of public administration systems in different nations. According
to this study, however, we can reach different conclusions. As illustrated above, the BRM had been
diffused beyond the borders of the U.S. and was benchmarked by the Korean government; however
the results of the BRM building between the two nations were different because of the impact of
different institutional arrangements. In conclusion, this study shows that the institutions are an
important mediator which alters and bend the impact of globalization in the field of e-government
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(Welch and Wong, 2001).
Thirdly, we can also see the actor-centric factors such as major actors who participate and
interact in projects, serve as sources of resistance, and compete with each other in the BRM building
process. As illustrated in this study, the ‘politics of e-government’ seems to be a critical and influential
factor in e-government outcomes.
If we take a cross-national comparative perspective on the BRM cases, however, we can ask
following questions: why the main goal of the project, which was a function-oriented BRM
independent of organizations, could be achieved in the U.S. but not in Korea although similar kinds of
conflicts and coordination problems commonly occurred over the course of the BRM construction in
both nations? This question can lead to more theoretical questions as follows: what structurizes the
politics of e-government; what creates the difference in power between participants during the course
of e-government building?
To answer the above questions more validly, we should consider the institutional factors which
structured the relations among actors in the policy process. According to new institutionalism,
institutions influence policy capacity because they grant decision-makers authority to mobilize
resources and control other participants (Weaver and Lockman, 1993). Moreover, institutions can
structure relations among actors (Nee and Ingram, 1998). We could find these points in the cases of
this study. For example, the coordination and powers of control of the two countries’ e-government
policy structures were differentiated because of the different characteristics of the legal frameworks
which mobilized the resources of the main organizations and granted the authority for the
coordination and control in the BRM building process. In conclusion, the different institutional
arrangements of e-government policy produced different structures among the actors’ relations,
delegated different resources and mobilized different authorities in the e-government policy process
(Fountain, 2007).
The theoretical contributions of this study are as follows. Firstly, this study contributes to
broadening explanations of e-government policy results by stressing the importance of institutions,
which have been underestimated by current main stream e-government research such as technological
determinism and actor-centric explanation. Secondly, this study is carried out from a cross-national
comparative perspective. The lack of comparative study at the level of e-government initiatives had
been considered a problem of e-government research and has consequently been targeted by this study
so as to possibly contribute to the advancement of e-government research from a comparative
perspective.
In spite of these contributions, this study has the following limitations. Firstly, this study is
limited in that it is general due to the case study design and may have internal- and external-validity.
In order to overcome this limitation, adopting quantitative methods and increasing the number of
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cases should be considered in future research. Secondly, this paper did not consider the institutional
characteristics of the governments which the BRMs were embedded in. For example, it can be said
that the public administrative system in the U.S. has been more function-oriented than that of Korea.
This different institutional characteristic of the government between these two nations may be an
important factor in explaining the different e-government outcomes. These limitations should present
themselves as research topics for future research.
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